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ABSTRACT

Whose War is it Anyway? How Afghanistan Turned into a Battlefield over Global Hegemony
During the Cold War
by
Kathryn Shapiro
Advisor: Professor Karen Miller

Traditional scholarship depicts the Cold War, which began immediately after World War
Two and ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, as a battle of freedom and democracy
over communism and authoritarian control. Cold War propaganda cartoons often show an Uncle
Sam figure facing off against the Soviet Union, or a Soviet Bear reaching out to grab and control
Western Europe. While this may have been popular Cold War discourse, a close look at internal
documents from the United States Government at the time reveals that the United States was
more interested in protecting resources and their role as a global super-power than with
protecting the freedom of the people around the world. This paper uses the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979 as a case study of how the American Government hid behind ideology
while pursuing their self-interests in select countries across the globe. More specifically, this
paper focuses on the Carter and Reagan Administrations, and I argue that President Carter and
his National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski sought to induce a Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan as a means to trap the Soviets in a stalemate, ultimately draining them of their
resources. While the Reagan Administration is typically credited with draining the Soviet Union
of their power, internal memos from National Security Advisor Brzezinski prove that it was
actually the Carter Administration that developed the strategic policy of luring the Soviet Union
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into Afghanistan while aiding anti-communist rebels to fight against the Soviets. The latter half
of the paper will focus on how the Reagan Administration worked to prolong the Soviet’s
presence in Afghanistan for as long as possible, despite public speeches and meetings where the
Reagan Administration blamed the destruction in Afghanistan on the Soviets refusal to
withdrawal. To help prove how the United States worked to create the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan and use it as a tool to win the Cold War, I will rely on archival research from both
the Carter and Reagan Administrations, as well as archival research from the Gorbachev
Administration in the Soviet Union. Ultimately, this paper aims to show how the United States
intentionally created turmoil in Afghanistan designed to drain the Soviet Union of their power,
all the while claiming they were aiding the anti-communist rebels as a means to protect the
Afghani people from the Soviets. By illustrating the United States deceptive foreign policy in
Afghanistan during the Cold War, I hope readers will be weary of foreign wars where the United
States claims it is involved because of ideological beliefs.
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The state never has any use for the truth as such, but only for the truth which is useful to it
whether it be truth, half-truth, or error.
Friedrich Nietzsche, 1874

Introduction
Traditional Cold War literature depicts a spirited battle over competing ideologies:
American liberalism and freedom versus Soviet-style communism, where the state and
government act as one. At the time, politicians from both sides presented the opposing ideology
as an existential threat to their beliefs and way of life. By instilling fear of a communist takeover
or Western expansionism, both sides were able to justify interventionist policies to protect their
allies. A close look at scholarly literature on the Cold War, however, suggests something else
entirely. Scholars such as Professor Odd Arne Westad argue that the Cold War was actually a
battle over resources and unipolar hegemony that resulted in long-term negative outcomes for
third-world states.1 I build on this insight and attempt to show how the United States’ was less
concerned with spreading ideology and more focused on eliminating Soviet power and influence
throughout the globe, while simultaneously protecting and expanding their resources and global
standing. I also demonstrate that hawkish Cold War foreign policy transcended political party
and was embraced by Conservatives and Liberals alike (I will later examine how Republican
President Reagan continued foreign policy created under Democratic President Jimmy Carter). In
Secret Wars: Covert Conflict in International Politics (2018), Austin Carson makes a similar
argument that both liberal and conservative U.S. Presidents during the Cold War engaged in
aggressive and hawkish foreign policy—a practice often associated with Republican Cold
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Warriors.2 My contribution to this field deals with the periodization of détente and how and
when it ended. Traditional scholarship (which will be reviewed in this paper) attributes the end
of détente to the Reagan Presidency. On the contrary, I argue that détente ended with the Carter
Administration through his aid to third-world countries fighting against Soviet allies. If this is
true, which evidence suggests it is, scholars will have to rethink the period of détente and the key
players in keeping—and breaking—the peace. My thesis is unique in that it focuses on the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as an example of the true motivation behind US Cold War
politics. By analyzing the United States’ foreign policy in Afghanistan under both President
Carter and President Reagan, it becomes clear that the United States’ main purpose in the Cold
War was to defeat Soviet influence. More specifically, evidence suggests it did not matter to the
United States’ the type of government in Afghanistan (and elsewhere in the world), so long as it
was not a part of the Soviet sphere of communism and influence. In the pages that follow, I will
rely on archival evidence to show how the United States manipulated Afghanistan as a tool to
achieve their Cold War aims, at the expense of the Afghani people who continue to suffer to this
day.
Literature Review
In The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and The Making of Our Time
(2005)3, Yale Professor Odd Arne Westad focuses on US and Soviet interventions during the
Cold War and analyzes how these interventions shaped the world we live in today. More
specifically, Westad claims that the most important aspects of the Cold War did not take place in
Europe but instead involved political and social developments in the Third World, especially in
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South Asia and Africa. 4 To Westad, the Cold War was largely a continuation of colonization
inasmuch as it consisted of the spread of Super-Power beliefs and conflict with anyone who
resisted the will of the Super-Power. While Westad focuses on several countries in the global
south, his handling of the United States intervention in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion
works alongside my analysis of US policy. His insights about the ways that the Third World was
involved in the Cold War provide a foundation for my claims here. While Westad focuses on the
Reagan Administration and spends little time discussing President Carter’s tenure, my focus here
emphasizes the continuities between President Carter and President Reagan’s handling of the
Cold War. In the chapter titled “Reagan’s Offensive”, Westad attributes increased US
involvement in Afghanistan as a result of President Reagan’s belief that left wing radicalism
posed a threat to US interests. While I agree with Westad that this was Reagan’s belief and
motivation, I expand on this argument and suggest the same belief and motivation to end leftwing radicalism was also shared by President Carter. Indeed, I argue that it was President Carter
who spearheaded the United States’ policy of aiding Afghan rebels to defeat the Soviet-backed
left wing regime. According to Westad, a large reason for President Reagan’s intervention in
Afghanistan was because he viewed third world leaders as corrupt and wanted to spread
American values and morality to the region.5 Respectfully, this is where I diverge with Westad’s
analysis on Afghanistan. While I do not doubt the claim that Ronald Reagan viewed third world
leaders as corrupt, evidence suggests that the reason for the United States’ actions in Afghanistan
was centered around the notion of preventing Afghanistan from becoming a Soviet satellite state.
This is further proven by the fact that after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the
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United States’ turned its back on the country and showed little interest in its future leadership so
long as it was free from Soviet influence. What’s more, I argue that Reagan’s actions in
Afghanistan were anything but moral—he and his administration infiltrated the region with
advanced weapons and aircraft and supported fundamentalist Islamic groups that disregarded
human rights in order to fight against the Soviet Union. While I part with Westad on the
reasoning behind the United States’ involvement, I agree with him on two major aspects: the
importance of the fall of Iran in reshaping US foreign policy and the importance the US placed
on Islam in defeating the Soviet Union. Indeed, Westad writes that after the US backed Iranian
coup d’état in 1954 that Iran became the United States’ biggest ally in the region, even
surpassing Israel. 6 Westad argues that Iran’s importance to the United States partially stemmed
from its desire to combat Arab radicalism and maintain a Western-friendly region (for example,
consider Iran and the United States’ efforts to defeat the Soviet-aligned Baath Party in Iraq). 7
When the Shah lost power in 1979, Westad argues the United States was forced to find another
ally in the region to protect US interests. Like I will argue later on in this paper, Westad suggests
that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan would not have been as intense (or happened at all) if
Iran never underwent its revolution in 1979. Both Westad and I argue that because the United
States lost Iran as an ally and pillar of Western interests (such as free markets and access to
resources), the US began increasing aid to rebel groups opposing communist regimes. As a result
of this increased aid to the rebel fighters, the Soviet Union likewise began to fear its security and
influence in the region and felt they had no option but to invade to protect the communist
government in Afghanistan.8 Finally, with regards to Islam, Westad highlights how the United
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States’ exploited the religion to unite Muslims in the region (of all descents) against the spread of
communism. Both Westad and I argue that by the United States declaring itself as a protector of
religion in the region, the United States was able to position itself as an ally of Muslim nations
working alongside them to defeat communism.

While much is known about President Reagan’s aggressive policies towards the Soviet
Union, President Jimmy Carter is often overlooked as a key player during the Cold War and
instead is viewed as a soft-spoken President focused largely on human rights around the world.
On the contrary, I argue in this paper—and divert from most literature—that Jimmy Carter was
more of a staunch Cold Warrior than he is given credit for, and that he was actively involved in
working to bring the collapse of the Soviet Union. While most scholars, such as Professor
Nicholas Sarantakes, view détente as ending with the Reagan Administration, I argue that the
policy of détente ended with the Carter Administration. In “Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter,
the Olympic Boycott, and The Cold War” (2011) historian and US Naval College Professor
Nicholas Sarantakes positions the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an event the Carter
Administration had trouble deciding how to respond to.9 While it is true that President Carter’s
Cabinet was often divided on foreign policy decisions, evidence from the Digital National
Security Archives reveals how President Carter, along with National Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski, worked to induce a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in order to trap the Soviets in a
stalemate and advance US interests of defeating the Soviet Union. Whereas Sarantakes views the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as an offensive Soviet decision to protect their interests in the
region, I argue the Soviets intervened as a response to increased US involvement in the region,
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and that the Carter Administration made the offensive policy choice to fund rebel groups to bring
down the Soviet-backed regime. A more accurate understanding of the events that led to the
Soviet invasion are important as it provides us with an opportunity to reconsider the Carter
Presidency and his contribution to the United States ultimate success in the Cold War. What’s
more, a proper understanding of US involvement in Afghanistan sheds light on perhaps the main
purpose of the Cold War—not to liberate suffering people from oppressive communist regimes,
but to spread unchallenged US influence and hegemony in all corners of the globe.

This thesis is also in conversation with A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal From
Afghanistan by University of Amsterdam Professor Artemy Kalinovsky.10 Professor Kalinovsky
similarly credits Odd Westad’s The Global Cold War as a seminal work of understanding the
conflict in Afghanistan between 1979-1989. Indeed, my thesis fits in conversation with both The
Global Cold War and The Long Goodbye as we all make similar claims that US involvement in
Afghanistan served as an opportunity to deliver a blow to the Soviet Union at the expense of the
Afghan people. In A Long Goodbye, Kalinovsky’s primary focus is to examine the factors that
forced the Soviet Union to remain in Afghanistan for ten years, despite initial Soviet reports
claiming they had little to no interest in becoming further involved in Afghanistan at all.11 In
order for Kalinovsky to reach a firm answer, he analyzes US foreign policy measures in
Afghanistan which also serves as additional evidence for my thesis. Perhaps Kalinovsky’s most
controversial claim—and where I agree with him the most—is his assertion that the Cold War
policy of détente (the period of relative peace during the Cold War) ended under the Carter
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Administration, before the Russians invaded Afghanistan.12 This is a diversion from traditional
literature, which views the end of détente as following the Soviet invasion and the United States’
subsequent boycott of the 1980 Olympics in Moscow. To help support his argument, Kalinovsky
cites both President Carter and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski’s moral belief
that the spread of Soviet-style communism around the globe posed an existential threat to the
United States.13 More convincingly, Kalinovsky also cites the Carter Administrations support for
the (at the time) Socialist country of Somalia against Soviet-backed Ethiopia during the Ogaden
War (1977-78) .14 For Kalinovsky, this highlights hawkish behavior not usually attributed to the
Carter Administration. What’s more, the reference to the Ogaden War also helps to prove my
argument that the United States’ (under both Carter and Reagan) was more concerned with
preventing the spread of communism than with creating liberal, open-market democracies. This
is not to say the United States’ did not want or benefit from open-market democracies, but more
important was defeating the Soviet Union and the spread of communism. Because this was the
United States’ primary goal, officials were willing to work with socialist ( Somalia) and
fundamentalist (Afghanistan) regimes to defeat Soviet expansionism. 15
Another major claim by Kalinovsky is that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was the
least-desired option for the divided politburo.16 Throughout the text, Kalinovsky details
numerous attempts by the Soviet Politburo to strengthen the communist PDPA party in
Afghanistan diplomatically, including attempts to unify the divided Khalq and Parcham factions
17.

Furthermore, Kalinovsky argues that the Soviet Union knew an invasion of Afghanistan
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would be costly and lead to global criticism.18 Because Kalinovsky portrays (and provides
evidence to support) that the Soviet Union viewed an invasion as the least-favorable scenario, he
explains that the ultimate decision to invade on December 24, 1979 resulted from heightened
turmoil in the Persian Gulf region, such as increased fighting within the PDPA and increased
Afghan resistance.19 To be sure, Kalinovsky’s analysis that the Soviet Union invaded because of
increased regional turmoil sheds light on my argument that the United States’ actively worked to
induce an invasion to trap the Soviets in Afghanistan by contributing to its greater instability (I
will explore later in this paper the various ways the United States’ intensified the chaos in
Afghanistan to their advantage). Both Kalinovsky and I argue that the fall of Iran in 1979 was
monumental in redefining both Soviet and American foreign policy, and that Afghanistan was of
little global significance until the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

18
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CHAPTER ONE: WHY AFGHANISTAN? A LOOK AT EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE 1979 SOVIET
INVASION

The Rise and Fall of U.S. Relations with Iran: 1953-1979
A central argument of my paper is that the United States’ (starting under President
Carter) only shifted its attention to Afghanistan in 1978/ 1979 because of the total collapse of
their relationship with Iran. The United States formed a strong alliance with Iran following
World War Two largely thanks to the pro-American Shah, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi (19411979). Iran proved so important to U.S. interests that in 1953 President Eisenhower (along with
Winston Churchill) authorized a covert operation in Iran to remove democratically elected
Prime Minister Mossadegh from power, with permission from Reza Shah Pahlavi.1 To be sure,
the covert operation was fueled by Cold War tensions—Iran nationalized their oil reserves under
Mossadegh in 1953 and expelled British Petroleum from Iran, creating fears among the
Eisenhower Administration that they would lose their biggest ally and trading partner in the
region.2 The coup d’état successfully removed Mossadegh from power, replaced him with U.S.backed General Fazlollah Zahedi, reinstalled Reza Shah Pahlavi and made him more powerful
than ever before. 3 After the coup d’état, the United States and Iranian Monarchy underwent a
period of over 20 years of partnership and good will, with Iran producing up to six million
barrels of the world’s oil per day.4
Nineteen seventy-eight proved to be a tumultuous year not only in Afghanistan but for
Iran as well. Internal unrest in Iran began to rise over the rule of U.S. backed Reza Shah Pahlavi,
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who many Iranians believed to be indifferent to the growing number of poor and suffering
Iranians and more concerned with the elite and their relationship with the West.5 For the Carter
Administration, discontent over Reza Shah Pahlavi could not have come at a worse time. Not
only did threat of a revolution jeopardize America’s alliance and influence in Iran, but it also
meant a large country with major resources, that borders the Soviet Union and was fostering antiAmerican sentiments, would potentially be open for Soviet influence. On December 12, 1978
(less than a month before Reza Shah Pahlavi was forced to flee Iran), U.S. Ambassador to Iran
George Ball wrote a letter to President Carter listing concerns over the impending revolution in
Iran.6 Titled “The Issues and Implications of the Iranian Crisis,” Ball argued that if Iran were to
fall to the Soviet Union (which we now know it did not), the world’s oil supply would be at
danger and the Cold War balance-of-power match would officially tilt towards the Soviet Union.
7

Further highlighting the importance of Iran to the United States, Ball wrote
The collapse of the Shah’s regime is far more significant than a localized foreign policy
crisis with exceptionally high stakes; it challenges the basic validity of the Nixon
doctrine. We made the Shah what he has become. We nurtured his love for grandiose
geopolitical schemes and supplied him the hardware to indulge his fantasies. Once we
had anointed him as protector of the Persian Gulf, we became dependent on him. Now
that his regime is coming apart under the pressures of imported modernization, we have
so committed ourselves as to have no ready alternative. (Emphasis mine) 8

In terms of the hardware mentioned by Ball, the United States provided the Iranian Air
Force with 7.5 billion dollars-worth of highly sophisticated military equipment and had a
“pipeline of orders” of American ships and naval systems ready to be sent to Iran at Reza Shah
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Pahlavi’s request.9 It is true that before the Carter Administration began sending aid and military
weapons to Afghanistan, it was supplying Iran with F-15 fighter planes and laser-guided
bombs—US manufactured technology so new that the United States’ Military had just began to
use it themselves in Vietnam. 10 Ball went so far as to say that if the Soviet Union increased its
aggression towards Iran, the United States should at least consider invasion and occupying the
Southern part of Iran where the oil fields were located.11 Ball justified the potential occupation of
South Iran by not only mentioning the shift of the Cold War balance-of-power to the Soviets, but
by claiming US allies (including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States) would then have to deal with
hostile forces next to the Gulf. 12 Ball’s severe warning about the consequences of an Iranian
revolution is telling for several reasons. First, it puts into perspective how important the United
States’ relationship with Iran up to 1979 was, which explains why the Carter Administration
reacted so strongly (i.e. considering invasion) in what otherwise could have been what Ball
considered a localized crisis.13 Ball himself admits that the United States’ was totally dependent
on Iran as not only an oil exporter but also as a pillar of Western values in the region.14 On
February 11, 1979, however, Sayyid Khomeini, (referred to by the West as Ayatollah Khomeini)
officially took power and Iran underwent a transition from a Monarchy to an Islamic Republic,
with Khomeini serving as the Supreme Leader of the new republic. Almost eight months later,
relationships between Iran and the Carter Administration reached an all-time low when the U.S.
Embassy in Iran was stormed by anti-American Iranian college students, and fifty-two American
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diplomats were then held at hostage by the Iranian government for over 400 days.15 While Iran
never fell to Soviet influence, I contend that the loss of Iran as an ally was monumental for the
United States and forced the Carter Administration to develop a new foreign policy in the Middle
East and South Asia. Because the loss of Iran was so devastating to the United States’ interests,
the United States’ then fully engaged in Cold War containment policy in the region to prevent
the Soviet Union from gaining further advances and a warm-water port in the Indian Ocean.
Once Iran became an Islamic Republic antagonistic to both the West and the Soviet Union, that
left Pakistan, India and Afghanistan as the remaining Cold War players in the region, with
Afghanistan serving as the only remaining buffer between the Soviet Union and the Indian
Ocean. In a later memo by U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan, Sullivan warned that
losing Iran as an ally was an “unthinkable” scenario for American Foreign Policy.16 Once the
unthinkable happened, the Carter Administration had to do whatever it could to save remaining
American interests in the Middle East and South Asia, and Afghanistan proved an integral piece
of the puzzle in doing so.

A Brief History of Afghanistan
Afghanistan has infamously been referred to as “the graveyard of empires” and for good
reason. While the British successfully expanded their empire to areas of South West Asia in the
1800s, they were driven out of Afghanistan twice during the two Afghan-Anglo Wars (18391842) (1878-1880). While fighting against British rule, the Afghans also successfully established
a defined border with Russia in 1895, despite Russian attempts to gain control of the region.17 In
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1919, Afghanistan defeated the British for the third and final time and officially declared
independence with the Treaty of Rawalpindi. From 1926-1973, Afghanistan existed as a
struggling monarchy, plagued with civil wars and the lack of development in the country. In
1933, Mohammed Zahir Shah became the final King of Afghanistan and ruled until he was
forced into exile in 1973. While Zahir Shah successfully brought aspects of modernization to
Afghanistan, such as the establishment of trade with surrounding countries and accessible
education to both men and women, he was unable to fully unite the country. In the early 1970s,
leftist groups in Afghanistan (such as the Khalq and Parcham) gained popularity and accused the
Shah of being corrupt and out of touch with the people of Afghanistan. As the leftist groups in
Afghanistan became more prominent, they relied on their border neighbor The Soviet Union for
training and funding.18 In 1973, while Zahir Shah was out of the country for medical treatment,
Army General Daoud Khan (and cousin to Zahir Shah) took advantage of the building leftist
momentum and staged a bloodless coup d’état that abolished the monarchy and declared
Afghanistan a republic with himself as the leader. While the coup d’état was initially successful,
fighting between the Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner) factions threatened the future of
communism in Afghanistan. As the Khalq’s consolidated power, they exiled prominent Parcham
leaders from Afghanistan. 19The Soviet Union became increasingly less confident in President
Khan’s ability to rule Afghanistan as a communist country, and on April 27th, 1978, the Sovietbacked People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) overthrew Afghan President Daoud
Khan. While denied by the Soviets, archival records reveal that the Soviet Union orchestrated the
coup d’état to remove Daoud Khan from power.20 The People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
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installed Khalq leader Nur Muhammad Taraki as the new President of Afghanistan. Immediately
after Taraki assumed office, Afghanistan broke out into a civil war between conservative Islamic
factions that opposed communist rule and the PDPA, which itself remained plagued by internal
differences.

The Sudden Turn Towards Afghanistan Explained
Perhaps Vice President Walter Mondale summarized the United States’ newfound
interests in Afghanistan best—he argued that the Soviets had turned a traditional buffer state into
a Soviet satellite state.21 To be sure, Afghanistan served as a buffer between the Soviet Union
and three states—Iran, Pakistan and India—all of which have an entrance to the Indian Ocean
and would provide the Soviet Union with a warm-water port if their influence and aggression
were to be successful.22 Mondale argued if the United States were to allow Afghanistan to fall to
Russia, the three states with entrances to the Indian Ocean would then be faced with Soviet
aggression themselves and be at greater risk of falling to Soviet influence which would result in a
complete loss of the region for the United States’ interests. National Security Advisor Brzezinski
believed the Indian Ocean was of vital importance to the Soviet Union because it would grant
their navy with an unprecedented warm water port and easier access to Africa and Western
Europe.23 In support of this theory, General David C. Jones (Air Force General and Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff) argued that the Soviets actually stood nothing to gain from invading
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Afghanistan and instead viewed the country as a steppingstone to the three states that border the
Indian Ocean.24
To trap the Soviets in Afghanistan, the Carter Administration made the decision to take
advantage of the Islamic rebel groups fighting against communism in the region. This was a
calculated and strategic Cold War move because prior to the Cold War and the watershed events
of 1979 the United States’ had little to no strategic relationship with Afghanistan or investment
to preserve Islam in the region. Six weeks after the PDPA overthrew Daoud Khan and replaced
him with Soviet-backed Nur Muhammad Tarakai, U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Theodore
Elliot wrote a memo to Secretary of State Cyrus Vance summarizing the change of power in
Afghanistan—it is important to remember that at the time this memo was written in June 1978,
the Soviets had not yet invaded.25 In the memo, Ambassador Elliot argued that the newly
installed PDPA government (under Taraki’s leadership) would not survive without support from
the Soviet Union.26 Elliot highlighted that the conservative Islamic opposition to the PDPA rule
was “powerful but disorganized and lacks a central leader”. 27 Considered in a Cold War context,
a promising anti-Soviet resistance proved of interest to the Carter Administration and presented
itself as a valuable tool in fighting with the Soviets over global superpower and influence.

With newfound interests in Afghanistan and the South Asian region as a whole, the
Carter Administration focused all of their attention on strengthening the Soviet resistance. The
new policy argued that the Soviet-resistance could be improved with external support and that
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the rebel fighters should engage in guerrilla warfare tactics (such as assassinations and terrorist
acts) while using Afghanistan’s mountainous terrain to their advantage.28 This recommendation
by Ambassador Elliot just six weeks after the PDPA assumed power reveals how the Carter
Administration began viewing Afghanistan as a strategic playing field for the Cold War prior to
the Soviet invasion in late 1979.

28
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CHAPTER TWO: HOW THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION INDUCED THE OFFICIAL SOVIET
INVASION

While I am not arguing that the Carter Administration initially wanted the Soviet Union
to invade Afghanistan, documents suggests that once the invasion became inevitable (due to
internal fighting amongst the communist PDPA), the Carter Administration began developing a
strategy to engage with the Soviets in Afghanistan as a means to drain their resources and overall
influence in the Middle East/ South Asian region. Internal documents reveal that the strategy of
draining the Soviets in Afghanistan and prolonging the conflict was then adapted and continued
by the Reagan Administration. The first instance of US covert aid to the Afghan rebels was
authorized by Jimmy Carter in the summer of 1979 almost six months before the Soviets
invaded.1 This stands in stark contrast to other scholarly literature such as Professor Sarantakes
who argue US aid to Afghanistan began in 1980, only after the Soviets invaded and civil war
broke out in the country. In an interview in French Magazine La Nouvel Observateur, National
Security Advisor Brzezinski revealed how the Carter Administration came to view the Afghan
crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their own agenda both at home and abroad.2 Brzezinski was
asked if it was true the Carter Administration began aiding the rebel groups in Afghanistan prior
to the Soviet Invasion (this was previously an unconfirmed fact and only speculated to in books
and essays recounting the United States involvement). Brzezinski’s reply is as follows:
Brzezinski: Yes. According to the official version of history, CIA aid to the Mujahiddin
began during 1980,that is to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan on December
24, 1979. But the reality, closely guarded until now, is completely otherwise: Indeed, it
was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the
opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And that very day, I wrote a note to the
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president in which I explained to him that in my opinion this aid was going to induce a
Soviet military intervention [emphasis added].3
Brzezinski’s answer as to whether or not the CIA aided the mujahideen prior to the Soviet
invasion not only confirms previous speculation but also demands a reevaluation of U.S. foreign
policy at that time. One might wonder why the United States’ wanted to induce (or went forward
with policy that they knew would induce) a Soviet invasion of any country, let alone in
Afghanistan, a region where the United States’ just recently lost their biggest ally. Indeed, it is
because the United States’ needed to reestablish a presence in the in the Middle East that they
decided to aid the rebel groups five months prior to the official Soviet invasion. The United
States’ hoped that by aiding the rebel groups, the resistance to the Soviet-backed Taraki regime
would strengthen, forcing the Soviet Union to intervene. Once the Soviet Union officially
invaded Afghanistan, the Carter Administration could publicly display their support for the rebel
fighters, citing common clichés such as that the United States’ was defending freedom and
preventing the Middle East from falling to communism. To be sure, the CIA funding of the rebel
groups in Afghanistan was a just one rung on the ladder of draining the Soviets and securing a
U.S. presence in the region after the massive blow of losing Iran as an ally.

The Carter Administration’s desire to create enough dissent in Afghanistan to force a
Soviet invasion came to fruition as 1979 came to a close. In September of 1979, Kabul Radio
announced Prime Minister Taraki was officially removed from office and replaced with
Hafizullah Amin (also a Khalq in the PDPA).4 While both Amin and Taraki belonged to the
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Khalq communist party in Afghanistan, Amin’s order to have Taraki killed proved to be the last
straw for the Soviet Union, as the Soviet-backed PDPA was badly suffering and losing
momentum even before Taraki’s assassination.5 On December 24 1979, the Soviet Union (under
the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev) sent the 40th Army into Afghanistan. Shortly thereafter,
Prime Minister Amin was killed in a coup d’état and replaced with Soviet-loyalist Babrak
Karmal.6 For Zbigniew Brzezinski, everything in Afghanistan was going according to plan.

The Soviet Union’s Vietnam
Along with claiming that the Soviet Union posed a lasting threat to Islam, the Carter
Administration relied on the funding and success of the rebel fighters to slowly dismantle the
Soviet Union’s presence in the country. While the United States’ funding of the rebel fighters is
often associated with the Reagan Presidency, unclassified documents reveal Carter himself
spearheaded the project.7 Indeed, National Security Advisor Brzezinski drew inspiration for the
Afghan rebel fighters from the guerilla warfare conducted by the Viet Cong in the Vietnam
War.8 By comparing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to America’s involvement in Vietnam,
Brzezinski was hopeful that the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan would be an unwinnable conflict
that would drain important Soviet resources (such as weaponry, soldiers, and support) in the
long run and ruin Soviet moral.9 To be sure, this was a fair analogy and there were several
similarities between the situation the Soviets found themselves in once invading Afghanistan and
with the United States’ pro-longed disastrous war in Vietnam. Indeed, the Carter Administration
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viewed the Afghan “guerilla fighters” as essential players in defeating the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan.10 Likewise, during the American war in Vietnam the Viet Cong method of guerilla
warfare was essential in preventing American success in the region. While Brzezinski saw the
potential for the rebel groups in Afghanistan to cause major damage to the Soviet’s goals in the
region, he was also quick to note the present limitations of the rebel fighters and different areas
where the rebels could be backed and propped up by the United States.11 Brzezinski conceded
that the Afghan guerrillas were badly organized and poorly led. He called attention to the fact
that the Afghan rebel groups had no sanctuary, no organized army, and no central government—
all of which was possessed by the Viet Cong. Lastly, (at the time of the invasion) the rebel
groups lacked major foreign support—unlike the “enormous” backing of the Viet Cong by the
Soviet Union and China.12

To address these concerns, Brzezinski recommended actions aimed at bolstering the rebel
groups in Afghanistan.13 Because the United States’ needed the resistance to the Russian-backed
government to continue, Brzezinski called for more money, weapons, and “technical advice” to
be sent to the rebel groups (how this happened will be explored in other sections).14 To achieve
this, Brzezinski recommended the United States’ strengthen their alliance with Pakistan by
means of sending Pakistan more aid, military weapons, political guarantees, and [redacted] for
their own use.15 These policy recommendations, while seemingly straightforward on page,
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carried substantial consequences and are important in understanding the motivations behind US
foreign policy in Afghanistan during the 1970s and 80s. Less important to the United States’ was
liberating the Afghan people from what the U.S .believed was forced communist rule. Instead,
the United States’ viewed the internal crisis in Afghanistan—which possessed a weak yet
promising resistance group—as an opportunity to strengthen U.S. hegemony in a strategic region
where U.S. influence was lacking. Unfortunately for Afghanistan, the Soviet invasion provided
the United States’ with the necessary conditions to achieve these goals. By working to develop a
resistance group in Afghanistan that resembled the tactical approach of the Viet Cong, the Carter
Administration saw an opportunity to create a long and exhaustive war in Afghanistan that would
ultimately weaken the Soviet’s desire to expand power into the Middle East/ South Asian region,
leaving a vacuum for the United States’ to exploit.

The Implementation of the United States Strategic Foreign Policy Towards Afghanistan
Under President Carter
Brzezinski was less concerned with the instability in the region as he was with the
potential leverage the Soviet Union stood to gain. Indeed, the United States’ eagerness to get
further involved in the affair is made clear in a December 25th memo from Brzezinski to
President Carter, where Brzezinski argued the conflict in Afghanistan was ripe for further U.S.
involvement, partly because Brzezinski believed global public opinion to be outraged at the
Soviet invasion.16 For the Carter Administration, the conflict presented itself as a way to drain
the Soviets of their power and exhaust their resources all the while solidifying US presence in the
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Middle East/ South Asian region. Of course, this was to be at expense of the Afghani people,
whose internal struggle over power quickly turned into a hegemonic Cold War playing field of
which the United States’ viewed as a potential huge win for their long-term self-interests both at
home and abroad.
To foster a global response (especially from third world countries vulnerable to Soviet
influence) the Carter Administration focused upon existing fears that Soviet communism posed
an existential threat to Islam.17 Because of the rational desire of the surrounding countries to
maintain their sovereignty (and thus religion and culture), the United States’ realized it could
feed into these anxieties and gain Muslim countries as allies against the Soviets. More
specifically, Brzezinski argued the United States’ should stress the amount of destruction caused
by the Soviets in Afghanistan to the surrounding Muslim countries in an attempt to not only gain
allies but create further resistance to the Soviet-backed regime.18 When developing the United
States’ policy of exploiting Islam to combat communism, Brzezinski argued the US should
“concert with Islamic countries both in a propaganda campaign and in a covert action campaign
to help the rebels”.19 This is important as it sheds light to the future and substantial propaganda
campaign led by the United States’ to unite Islamic countries against the perceived threat of
communism against Islam. One of the many ways the US administration stressed the perceived
danger of the Soviet Union and communism was through the staggering amount of Afghan
refugees fleeing their home, often ending up in neighboring Pakistan. At the time of the invasion,
300,000 Afghanis had already fled to Pakistan, which itself was ill equipped to handle the ever-
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increasing number of refugees crossing the border.20 To be sure, the Carter Administration
realized they could capitalize off the intense human suffering in Afghanistan to unite the global
community, both Muslim and otherwise. The threat to religion and freedom posed by the Soviets
served as the perfect tool for the United States’ to spark fear and rebellion in the Middle East,
ultimately in the name of jihad (jihad will be later explored in much more detail). While it is
certain the anger over the human suffering in Afghanistan would have existed without the
American exploitation of it, the U.S. government found themselves in the unique position to fund
and train fighters in an otherwise poor and unorganized country.

Once the Soviet Union officially invaded Afghanistan in December of 1979, the Carter
Administration had to determine the most effective way to get the maximum amount of aid to the
rebel fighters so they could fight against the sophisticated Soviet military. The agreed upon
policy (continued by Ronald Reagan) was to funnel aid and weapons through Pakistan so as not
to appear as the United States was engaging in a Cold War game at the expense of Afghanistan.
While Jimmy Carter publicly expressed support for the rebel fighters, he did want to be seen as
participating in regime change in a sovereign country—the same thing the US was criticizing the
Soviets of. A CIA Office of the Historian document reveals that when determining the proper
amount of aid to send to the rebels just three days after the official invasion, Secretary of
Defense Harold Brown agreed that sending aid to the Afghan rebels was necessary but wondered
if the US was sending enough to be effective, indicating that aid had already been sent.21 New to
the Administration’s plan, however, was sending arms for the rebels through Saudi Arabia.22
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When President Carter inquired to how the Pakistanis’ would feel about the US government also
sending arms through Saudi Arabia, Secretary Brown replied he believed Pakistan would feel
very positive about it (likely because Pakistan assumed they would receive aid from Saudi
Arabia as well.)23 President Carter’s concern over how the Pakistanis would feel about the
United States also allying with the Saudis to send aid to the Afghan rebels further demonstrates
how important Pakistan was in securing the administrations interests in the region. Showing
slight pushback against Brzezinski, President Carter noted that news analyst said the Soviets
would have “little hope” in putting down the Afghan rebellion at its present state at the time of
the invasion on December 25th.24 Holding his ground that the United States’ must increase
support to the rebels, Brzezinski argued that not increasing aid would have a negative
psychological impact both on the Pakistanis and Afghan rebels fighting the Soviets at home.25
What’s more, Brzezinski argued that if the United States’ was not the leader of spearheading aid
to the Afghan rebels, international support for the rebels would be likely to fizzle out.26 This
helps to demonstrate the administrations early policy towards Afghanistan after the Soviet
invasion: supply covert aid and support the rebels while attempting to garner international
support both for the Afghan rebels and against the Soviet Union. This also highlights what I
argue was the constant push by both the Carter and Reagan Administrations to draw international
attention to Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. Because the Carter Administration sought to make
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as “costly as possible”, they needed all the international
support and additional aid to the rebels they could get.27

23

Ibid.
Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 “Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committe Meeting.”
24

24

No later than December was a firm policy set into motion by the Carter Administration
on how to move forward with draining the Soviets in Afghanistan. While the policy aimed to
strengthen US Cold War interests by limiting Soviet expansion, it also revealed the United
States’ hypocrisy towards international law and President Carter’s willingness to set aside human
rights concerns through partnering with authoritarian regimes. In a highly classified meeting with
the United States’ National Security Council, consisting of President Carter, Vice President
Mondale, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, CIA Admiral Stansfield Turner and National Security
Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, it was decided US officials would go to Pakistan to engage in with
the Pakistani military on a “high level mission” on how to move forward with aid to the Afghan
rebels.28 To effectively send aid and weaponry to the rebel fighters in Afghanistan, President
Carter needed to strengthen the United States’ relationship with Pakistan, which shared a largely
uncontrolled border with Afghanistan. Despite President Carter’s reputation of upholding human
rights, he willingly forged a strong alliance with Pakistan President Zia al-Huq, a controversial
figure that will be explored later on in this paper.29 President Carter then decided to increase
military sales to Pakistan and engage with the Saudis to help finance Pakistani military
purchases, with the ultimate goal of Pakistan transferring the weapons to the Afghan rebels.30 31
This proved controversial because the United States could not legally sell arms on credit to
Pakistan because of the Symington Amendment, which banned US military assistance and aid to
countries producing nuclear enrichment (this willingness by the Carter Administration to

28

“Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting.”
Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 For more on the legacy of Zia al-Huq, see Ziring, “Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan’s Nationality Problem.”
29

25

subvert—and later completely ignore—international law was a common practice in the
Administration’s policy towards Afghanistan and was later fiercely pursued by the Reagan
Administration as well). Tellingly, Secretary Vance revealed that Pakistani Advisor to the
President for Foreign Affairs, Agha Shahi, had asked him that if the situation in Afghanistan got
worse, whether the United States would continue sell military equipment to Pakistan, to which
Secretary Vance replied that the United States’ would.32 This admission by Secretary Vance
highlights the willingness of the Carter Administration to ignore international law if the
administration stood to gain from it. What’s more, this reflects just how important halting the
Soviets in South Asia was to the Carter Administration. If the situation in Afghanistan were to
deteriorate, as Shahi suggested, Secretary Vance agreed the United States’ would continue to
send military aid to Pakistan, despite the Symington Amendment.33 Indeed, the Carter
Administration was willing to ignore international law and continue sending aid to Pakistan,
because if Afghanistan fell to Soviet influence, Pakistan (which has an entrance to the Indian
Ocean) would then likely face Soviet aggression themselves. This contradiction by Vance also
highlights what I argue was the United States’ engaging in foreign policy aimed at Cold War
strategy at the expense of the South Asian region. The discussion from this December 28 th
meeting indeed suggests that the Carter Administration was engaging so deeply in Afghanistan
and Pakistan not because of their resources or former alliances, but because of what the Soviet
Union stood to gain by having a presence in the region. Finally, because Afghanistan itself
possessed no nuclear capability, Secretary Vance called for more PL 480 (Food for Peace)
assistance directly to Afghanistan as well as more relief for the Afghan refugees.34
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On November 4th 1980, less than a year after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
President Carter lost his re-election bid to Republican candidate Ronald Reagan. By the time of
the election, the United States government—specifically the CIA—was well under way in its
attempt to strengthen the Afghan resistance to the Soviet Union. In his final State of the Union
speech, President Carter called the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the greatest threat to World
peace since World War Two and stressed the importance of maintaining a Soviet-free Middle
East, all the while making no mention of the Administrations funding of anti-Soviet rebel
groups.35 Instead, Carter engaged in Cold War rhetoric claiming that the Soviet Union was
actively oppressing the “fiercely independent” and “deeply religious” people of Afghanistan.36
While there is no question the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violated international law and
Afghanistan’s sovereignty, President Carter’s final State of the Union speech helps prove how
the Carter Administration used Cold War language and played up Cold War anxieties of the
Soviets oppressing free people and attacking religion as a façade while the Administration
secretly worked to develop a smooth-running pipeline of money and weapons between the CIA,
Pakistan, and the Afghan rebels. Publicly, President Carter reaffirmed sanctions against the
Soviet Union and expressed sympathy towards the Afghan people, saying the United States’
respected Islam and was willing to work with all Muslim countries to defeat the Soviet Union.37
This proved a perfect opportunity for President Carter to invoke the public outrage Brzezinski
called for over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan while simultaneously using Afghanistan as a
tool to trap and ultimately drain the Soviet Union of power and influence. While Ronald Reagan
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is often credited with bankrupting the Soviet Union, it is actually President Carter and Zbigniew
Brzezinski who put the plan into motion.
Despite attempts to keep the funding of rebel groups secret, in the closing months of 1979
Soviet Newspaper Izvestia published a report claiming that the CIA was directly engaged in
aiding the Afghan rebel groups as well as involved with providing military training to Afghan
rebels in Pakistani camp.38 Indeed, documents have since revealed that President Carter signed
off on covert action in January of 1980 which allowed the CIA to purchase Soviet-designed
weapons from Egypt and China to send to the Afghan rebels (via Pakistan).39 Two weeks after
the official Soviet invasion, Pakistan received its first Afghanistan-bound arms shipment of rifles
from the United States.40 By February of the same year, Zbigniew Brzezinski flew to Pakistan to
meet with Pakistani President Zia Ul-Haq and the two men worked to officially establish an
effective pipeline of aid and weaponry to Afghanistan from Pakistan.41 According to one CIA
agent, the United States was not acting as a middleman but instead as a liaison between Pakistan
and Afghanistan.42 After meeting with President Zia, Brzezinski then flew to Saudi Arabia where
he met with King Khalid and reached an agreement for Saudi Arabia to match each dollar of US
aid to the Afghan resistance.43 It is worth nothing that by early 1980, the Carter Administration
had garnered support for the Afghan rebels in terms of financial aid and weaponry from Great
Britain, Saudi Arabia, China and Egypt.44 Central to the CIA’s orchestration of the arms pipeline
was plausible deniability of any lethal American involvement in Afghanistan, because according
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to President Carter in 1980, the only action the U.S. government was taking on the events in
Afghanistan was sanctioning the Soviet Union.45 One of the ways the Administration practiced
plausible deniability was by purchasing arms from Eastern Europe and then sending the
weaponry to Pakistan, thus avoiding any way to trace the arms back to the U.S.46 Indeed, the
CIA under the Carter Administration intentionally purchased arms that would appear to belong
to the Soviet Union. In an interview with Harvard Professor Kirsten Lundberg and CIA agent
Frank Anderson about the weapons pipeline, Anderson said
“We got Commies to send us guns, and we shipped them around the world and shot them back at
them. That is the kind of thing the CIA is meant to do and is good at….The covert aspect of this
was a bunch of nations agreeing not to plead guilty to what they were going to do”.47
By the time the Carter Administration began to reach its end, the CIA had purchased a total of 30
million in arms for the Afghan rebels, a number matched by Saudi Arabia.48 When President
Ronald Reagan took office in January of 1981, Zbigniew Brzezinski’s plan to trap the Soviets in
Afghanistan was well underway. While the Afghan resistance continued to fight for liberation
against the Soviets, Ronald Reagan picked up from where his predecessor left off and sought to
make the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as costly as possible, not for the sake of the Afghan
people but to demolish the Soviet Union’s status as a global superpower.
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How Pakistan Proved to be The Perfect Arena for the United States Policy Games
President of Pakistan Zia Ul-Haq expressed excitement with the 1980 nomination of
President Ronald Reagan, who Zia believed would be willing to send more aid to Pakistan than
former President Carter. 49 Indeed, President Zia’s desire to become a regional power along with
his admiration for Ronald Reagan helped the United States’ take advantage of the geographical
significance of Pakistan, which served as a pro-Western country boarding the Soviet Union. The
United States’ alliance with Pakistan initially began under the Truman Presidency in 1947,
almost immediately after Pakistan declared independence from India. At the time, the United
States’ had no relationship with Afghanistan but a strong relationship with Reza Shah Pahlavi of
Iran, a leader interested in modernizing Iran and creating strong ties with the West. In 1959, the
United States and Pakistan signed a bilateral Treaty of Cooperation and Defense Agreement
designed to further implement the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), a Cold War treaty
aimed at containing the Soviet Union. CENTO, previously known as the Baghdad Pact, consisted
of Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and (briefly) Iraq and served as a mutual defense agreement against
Soviet Aggression.50 While the United States never officially joined CENTO, it participated as
an observer and in committee meetings and signed treaties with the respective individual
participants (such as the aforementioned Treaty of Cooperation and Defense with Pakistan).
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan found itself surrounded by
turmoil—an enemy on one of its borders and a country facing Russian aggression on the other.
For the United States, Pakistan proved to be the perfect country to bolster in order to combat
Soviet aggression in the South Asian region. To be sure, the United States and Pakistan already
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possessed a strong alliance at the time of the invasion, with the United States’ sending over 200
million dollars in aid to Pakistan in 1978.51 Once the invasion of Afghanistan happened,
Pakistan’s strategic significance with the United States increased, as the United States’ began to
rely on Pakistani military bases and their intelligence services (the ISI) to train the Afghan rebel
forces. Indeed, both Pakistan and the United States’ had shared interests in the region, primarily
keeping out Soviet aggression and developing Pakistan as a regional power that promoted
Western interests. Because President Zia was unsatisfied with President Carter’s 1979 proposed
aid package of 400 million dollars, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Gerald Feierstein advised
President Reagan on how to create a package suitable for Pakistan’s demands. Specifically,
Feirerstein urged the Reagan Administration to send first-class military weapons to Pakistan
(such as the Mirage 2000), as opposed past military equipment President Zia considered
insufficient.52 President Reagan agreed with Feierstein’s proposal to increase the amount of aid
to Pakistan, and acknowledged himself that the fall of the Shah in Iran and the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan greatly increased “strategic significance” of Pakistan to the United States.53 To be
sure, the United States concern with creating a suitable aid package for Pakistan demonstrates
how using Pakistan as a Cold War instrument to help defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan was a
main priority for both the Carter and Reagan Administrations.

When laying out his Administration’s policy towards Pakistan, President Reagan
explicitly stated he planned to bolster Pakistan’s military to help with the support of Afghan
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rebel groups fighting against the Soviet Union.54 This is a departure from the Carter
Administration, who preferred to keep their aid and financial support of the rebels in Afghanistan
clandestine. This is certainly not to say President Reagan was entirely transparent with his
strategy towards Afghanistan, but he wanted the international community to know that the
United States was on the side of the “freedom fighters” and those standing up against Soviet
aggression.
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CHAPTER 3: RONALD REAGAN’S CONTINUATION OF THE CARTER ADMINISTRATIONS FOREIGN
POLICY IN AFGHANISTAN

While the Carter Administration did not have to deal with substantial blowback from the
international community regarding their policy in Afghanistan (note the intricacies of the Carter
Administration’s policies in Afghanistan were not known until much later), the Reagan
Administration did receive international pushback, namely from India . When Ronald Reagan
took office in 1981, the United States was already aligned with Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and China all in an effort to aid the mujahideen to fight against the Soviet army.
This strong Western-backed alliance consisting of major regional players, along with increased
aid and military weapons to Pakistan, made Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi extremely
weary of the Reagan Administration.1 At the crux of the tension was what Prime Minister
Gandhi believed to be two very different visions for the future of South Asia—India’s nonaligned, deeply sovereign and protectionist version (economic liberalization in India did not
begin until 1991) and the pro-Western free market South Asia the U.S. sought to create.2 India’s
disdain towards America’s alliance with Pakistan came as no surprise to the American
Government, as Pakistan and India have had a bitter rivalry and engaged in almost constant
warfare since the partition of the two countries in 1947 (see the Indian Independence Act of
1947). Tensions between Pakistan and India were again heightened during the Bangladesh War
of Independence in 1971, with the double-blow of Pakistan support for the separation of
Bangladesh from India and the United States’ refusal to give aid to any India during the war.
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According to U.S. Ambassador to India John Gunther Dean, the Nixon government not only
refused to provide aid to India during the Bangladesh War, but continued to provide aid to the
Pakistani’s and strategically sent an aircraft carrier over Calcutta, which the Indian’s perceived
(correctly) as a sign of pro-Pakistani support by the U.S.3

Documents suggest that during the Carter Presidency, the Indian Government knew little
about the U.S. aid pipeline from Pakistan to Afghanistan. Indeed, it was not until Indira Gandhi
was re-elected in January of 1980 that the Indian Government began to vocalize concerns over
the massive amount of U.S. sent to Pakistan. This makes sense when you consider President
Carter’s aid to Pakistan, designated for Afghanistan, was largely covert and small in comparison
to the aid sent by the Reagan Administration. When Reagan took office, much of the
controversial programs and policies put into place by President Carter began to come to light,
such as the U.S. Governments violation of the Symington Amendment and willingness to ignore
international norms prohibiting the further development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the
Reagan Administration worked to strengthen the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, with the
goal of making the Pakistan arms and aid pipeline to the rebel fighters (mujahideen) as efficient
as possible.4 While President Reagan had his eyes on the long-term goal of draining the Soviets
in Afghanistan, India viewed a stronger and more advanced ISI as detrimental to their national
security.5 To make matters worse for India, the United States Government (under both Carter and
Reagan) teamed up with the Chinese Government to send millions in aid to Pakistan. Since
Pakistan’s split from India in 1947, China had previously supported Pakistan in its numerous
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wars against India and (like the United States’) viewed India as leaning towards the Soviet
Union. When discussing Pakistan’s nuclear program, U.S Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
(of the Carter Administration) and China’s Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping both agreed to “set
aside” concerns of Pakistan’s nuclear program and instead focus on strengthening Pakistan to
help combat Soviet aggression in South West Asia.6 Indeed, both officials made this agreement
because they viewed reducing Soviet power in the region as more important than maintaining a
steady record on enforcing international law. Essentially, it proved more advantageous for the
United States and China to promote Pakistan as a steppingstone in their plan of draining the
Soviet Union instead of punishing it for violating international laws. While Vice Premier Deng
Xiaoping agreed with sending aid to Pakistan, he also encouraged Secretary Brown to keep the
support to Pakistan secret, as India had already called out the United States for its blatant support
for Pakistan (despite Pakistan’s nuclear program) and accused the U.S. of providing Pakistan
with information on uranium.7 Indeed, this proves how the Carter Administration dismissed
international law because their interests of gaining leverage against the Soviet Union outweighed
previous laws and customs prohibiting the aid to a country developing nuclear weapons. While
this practice of turning a blind eye to non-proliferation to advance US interests is more
commonly attributed to the Reagan Administration, as mentioned by Professor Artemy
Kalinovsky, evidence shows it was in fact first put into effect by the Carter Administration.
While President Reagan received condemnation from India for his administration’s alliance with
nuclear Pakistan, it was actually the Carter Administration at the head of the policy.
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Developing Nuclear Programs in Pakistan and India: How Pakistan Got Away with Their
Rogue Nuclear Program
Despite the stark contrasts between India and Pakistan’s respective nuclear programs,
(with India’s being far more transparent and civilian-geared), the Reagan Administration refused
aid to India—citing their developing nuclear program—but sent billions in aid to Pakistan. To be
sure, this was a part of President Reagan’s long-term Cold War strategy in the region, in which
Pakistan proved a vital player in draining the Soviets and thus was met with appeasement by
President Reagan. Official reports revealed India abided by the International Atomic Energy
Agency’s guidelines and had a transparent nuclear program, whereas Pakistan’s program was
largely secretive and in violation of IAEA guidelines.8 Like his predecessor, President Reagan
ignored international norms for the sake of the United States’ advantageous alliance with
Pakistan. Indeed, President Reagan himself expressed that a strong relationship with Islamabad
was the “crux” of U.S. success in the region and that his administration would do whatever
necessary to maintain Pakistan’s faith in the United States.9 India founded its nuclear program in
the 1940s, before the Non-Proliferation Treaty was created.10 According to Indian officials at the
time, India’s goal was to use 500 tons of thorium for energy production.11 In 1974, India
detonated a nuclear device as a way to show military and technical superiority in the South Asia
region, especially against Pakistan. By the time India tested their nuclear device in ‘74, the
largely successful Non-Proliferation Treaty was in effect. Importantly, India had not signed the
NPT and claimed its nuclear program is for civilian use only. India also made an effort to keep
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its nuclear program transparent, and for the most part allowed inspectors and foreigners into the
nuclear facilities.12 What’s more, India has published financial and technical reports on their
nuclear program, readily available to the public. Unlike India’s accessible nuclear facilities,
Pakistan’s nuclear program has largely been kept secret and under tight wraps by the ISI. Indeed,
in the 1970’s Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto said it was the goal of Pakistan’s nuclear
program to create a nuclear weapon.13 What’s more, Pakistan had a large enrichment facility in
the city of Kahuta which was not justified as a civilian program (like India’s), because Pakistan
lacked the ability to build nuclear power stations. What’s more, Pakistan worked to produce
enriched uranium, which serves as fuel for nuclear armaments.14 Also unlike India, Pakistan
refused to disclose monetary and technical reports for their nuclear program.15 While it was the
goal of India’s nuclear program to reprocess spent fuel to recover plutonium to reduce waste,
Pakistan had no such civil goal and instead worked to enrich uranium.16

When recounting his time as Ambassador to India in the 1980s, John Dean illustrates
how the Reagan Administration dismissed international law and created great instability in both
Pakistan and Afghanistan as a means to secure U.S. interests in the region, mainly to strengthen
the Afghan rebel-forces against the Soviet aggression. Specifically, Dean stressed the
relationship between the American CIA and Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). According to
Dean, the DEA could not preform inspections for drug trafficking outside of the U.S. without
permission from the CIA. Thus, the DEA was essentially under control of the CIA when
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operating abroad. This is important because the CIA prohibited the DEA to adequately
investigate Pakistan, which was not only funneling arms from the United States’ to send to
Afghanistan, but drugs (specifically heroin) as well.17 To deliver the arms to Afghanistan sent by
the United States to Pakistan, the ISI created two secret paths into Afghanistan.18 One route
relied on Pakistan Air Force transports, while the main route was operated National Logistic
Cell, a state-owned transportation organization. The influx of arms and drugs was so prevalent in
Pakistan during the 1980’s that Prime Minister Bhutto said Pakistan society was dominated by
the “kalatchnikof rifle” (AK47S) sent by the United States and heroin.19 During the height of the
aid pipeline, it is estimated that Pakistan’s opium output to Afghanistan increased from 270 to
800 tons from 1979-1987. Indeed, this shows how the Reagan Administration’s aid to
Afghanistan and Pakistan transformed an already-corrupt Pakistan to a militant and drug-fueled
society, in the name of American interests in the region.
When the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in August 1981 of the
lack of safeguards at Pakistan’s nuclear powerplant in Karachi, an unnamed U.S. Special
Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence observed that Pakistan was not concerned with
the agency’s findings.20 More specifically, the IAEA found evidence in Karachi of a large
amount of irradiated fuel that contained enough plutonium for a nuclear explosive. India in turn
accused the United States of providing Pakistan with information on nuclear enrichment.21 Not
only did Pakistan show little concern over the IAEA’S findings, the Pakistani Ambassador in
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Washington told the Reagan Administration it would refuse pressure to upgrade their nuclear
safeguards in Karachi.22 Indeed, the U.S. Special Assistant to Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence
chalked up Pakistan’s apathy of the IAEA’S findings to Pakistan President Zia believing it would
not affect United States’ aid and military assistance to Pakistan (he was right).23 In response to
the IAEA’s findings, President Zia said Pakistan would never abandon its right to conduct nonmilitary nuclear research, despite that the finding revealed Pakistan did not possess the
technology to do so.24 The IAEA’S 1981 findings also mark one of the first times Indian Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi expressed serious concern to the Reagan Administration. At the 1981
Cancun Summit on Cooperation and Development, Prime Minister Gandhi voiced that the
United States’ military aid to Pakistan, specifically of F-16 aircraft, and continual support of
Pakistan despite their development of nuclear weapons posed a “national security threat” to
India.25 Despite India’s valid concerns over its neighbor developing nuclear weapons, the Reagan
Administration continued to send arms and monetary aid to Pakistan. This also shows how
President Reagan continued his predecessor’s tight alliance with Pakistan, as President Reagan
increased aid to Pakistan not even seven months into his first year of his administration. What’s
more, President Reagan dismissing Prime Minister Gandhi’s concerns over national security
sheds light to the United States’ main priority at the time—creating a legitimate resistance and
challenge for the Soviet Union in South West Asia. This is not to say the Reagan Administration
was unaware of the very real consequences of a nuclear Pakistan. At the beginning of his term in
1981, the Special Assistant to the Proliferation of Nuclear Intelligence warned President Reagan
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that a proliferated country such as Pakistan could spark a chain reaction in the region.26
Additionally, the Assistant warned that increased proliferation increases the chances of loss of
arms control as well as the opportunity for terrorists or subnational groups to obtain nuclear
materials.27 Privately, the Reagan Administration justified its tight alliance with Pakistan as a
way to build confidence in the Pakistan Government that they do not need nuclear weapons and
are protected by the Americans.28 Ironically, however, an advanced, armed and powerful
Pakistani military meant stronger resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan which served to benefit
the United States’ Cold War interests.

Ronald Reagan’s Russian Bear Trap: How his Administration Prolonged the Soviet War in
Afghanistan
While Zbigniew Brzezinski and President Carter devised a plan to get the Soviet Union to
invade Afghanistan, it was up to the Reagan Administration to exhaust them of their resources.
To do so, one of Reagan’s central strategies was to portray the United States as protector of the
third-world and preserver of Islam, when in reality the policies he invoked had the sole intention
of advancing U.S. Cold War interests. When writing one of the many National Security
Directives on Afghanistan, President Reagan stressed it was of utmost importance that the Soviet
Army not defeat the rebel fighters.29 For Reagan, the longer the Soviets were in Afghanistan
fighting against the rebel groups, the better for the United States’ ultimate end game of draining
the Soviets. According to Reagan, the brutal fighting between the Afghan rebels and Soviet
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Union would serve to an example for other third-world countries (most with weak militaries),
that the Soviet Union was willing to invade militarily if it suited their interests.30 More
specifically, Reagan wanted to demonstrate to the Third World that the Soviet Union was not the
protector of third world interest but instead an aggressor. Indeed, Reagan hoped this would be a
deterrent for other third world countries to align with the Soviet Union and instead inch closer to
the United States’, who positioned itself as the liberator of the Thir World from Soviet
aggression.31 For President Reagan, the United States’ aid to the rebel groups in Afghanistan
served as an example of the United States’ commitment to anti-Soviet insurgencies in other
contentious regions, such as Central America and Africa.32 It was important for the Reagan
Administration that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—and the United States’ response—not
appear as an East- West confrontation but as a third world struggle, of which the United States’
would appear as liberators and the Soviets as the aggressors.33 Like the Carter Administration,
Reagan also viewed the importance Islam in the region as a tool to defeat the Soviets. In his
policy objectives, Reagan stressed the importance of surrounding Muslim countries knowledge
of Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Similarly, the Reagan Administration believed fellow Islamic
countries would be outraged by the atrocities performed by the Soviet Union, and that this
outrage would inspire Muslim people around the world to join the effort of defeating the Soviet
Union.34 Because of this shared belief, President Reagan looked to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman,
Bahrain, Jordan, Morocco and the Sudan as countries with significant Muslim populations likely
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to be outraged by the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.35 While publicly allying with the
aforementioned countries to preserve Islam and defend the Afghan rebels, the Reagan
Administration quietly hoped to gain military bases and more access to the oil-rich region.36 To
be sure, citing Islam to gain pro-Western allies was a disingenuous policy by both the Carter and
Reagan Administrations, as they had little concern in preserving Islam but instead saw the
religion as a tool to increase their global super-power status. Indeed, the Reagan administration
launched a fierce propaganda campaign to unite Muslim countries against the Soviet Union.

One of the many ways the Reagan Administration worked to foster pro-American
sentiments in Afghanistan during the Soviet invasion was through the American Friends of
Afghanistan project (AFA), a 501(C) established in 1979 to provide humanitarian assistance to
the people of Afghanistan.37 President Reagan utilized the organization to instill democratic
principles for the people of the Afghan resistance. While providing education for educations sake
itself would be noble of President Reagan, I argue that because of the unique situation
Afghanistan was placed in—caught in the middle of a Cold War fight—Reagan’s desire to
provide education to the Afghan resistance was a move to strengthen animosity towards The
Soviet Union and increase the power of the resistance. Indeed, a look at the goals of the
Afghanistan Democratic Education Project helps prove this. The Education Project only applied
to eligible students living in areas controlled by the resistance and to men actively fighting in the
resistance against the Soviets.38 Specifically, the Education Project (totaling 180,000 dollars in
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US funds) aimed to establish twenty education centers at the “freedom fighters” make-shift
military bases and to supply the literacy centers with documents that focused on life in
Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion.39 The freedom fighters were also provided (and trained)
with video minicameras to record their everyday life fighting against the Soviets to provide video
documentation of the war for the people of Afghanistan.40 Along with the video footage of the
war, the Education Project also relied on and distributed cassette tapes with recordings in Dari
and Pashto to provide civilians of the Afghan resistance with news and commentary of the war.41
The cassette tapes were mixed with anti-Soviet war commentary as well as Afghan folk tales and
music in order to appear familiar and trustworthy to the Afghans.42 While the Education Project
provided the Western-based curriculum and materials, teachers at local schools were selected off
recommendations from the mujahideen (the Afghan rebel fighters).43 For the Reagan
Administration, these centers were used to demonstrate to both the resistance and civilians just
how damaging the Soviet invasion was to life in Afghanistan.44 While there is no question the
Soviets committed mass atrocities in Afghanistan, President Reagan’s reliance on the Education
Project is certainly disingenuous for several reasons. First off, it is the central argument of my
paper that the American’s saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as likely and thus worked to
make the invasion happen and to make it as costly as possible for America’s strategic benefit.
One of the ways both the Carter and Reagan Administrations worked to make the invasion as
costly as possible was by highlighting the damage caused by the Soviets to Afghan people and
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the status of Islam in the region (see Brzezinski’s Reflections on Soviet Invasion in Afghanistan).
So, while the Education Project focused on the terrible actions from the Soviet Union, the
motivation behind providing the documents and video footage was double-sided at best.
At home in the United States, President Reagan worked tirelessly to increase U.S. support
for the Afghan rebels. To increase domestic support for the Afghan rebel fighters, President
Reagan called for increased United States Information Agency (USIA) programming on the war
in Afghanistan, concentrating on Soviet bombing in both Pakistan and Afghanistan and the
subsequent refugee crisis.45 Another one of the ways President Reagan often rallied for support
for the Afghans was to emphasize the role of the rebels as “freedom fighters” willing to fight and
die for liberty—a cause familiar to the history of the United States.46 To pull on patriotic beliefs,
President Reagan declared March 10, 1982 the official day of Afghanistan.47 National news
crews and representatives from Japan, Thailand, Kenya and Austria all gathered in the East
Room of the White House to hear President Reagan and a young girl refugee from Afghanistan
speak. In her speech, the Afghan girl thanked President Reagan and his administration for all of
their help against the Soviet Union and presented President Reagan with an Afghan flag to
symbolize freedom and hope for Afghanistan.48 In the President’s speech, Reagan expressed his
admiration for the Afghan people fighting for peace and freedom in what he called an
“unprovoked attack”.49 I argue that this statement of an unprovoked attack from the Soviets by
President Reagan is extremely untrue and misleading. Previously mentioned evidence shows
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how the United States’, under President Carter, instigated the Soviet invasion to trap the Soviets
in the region (see From the Shadows, p146). Moreover, the longer and more intense the fighting
against the Afghans and Soviet Union, the better for the United States’ Cold War interests.
Reagan went on to talk about the very real damage done by the Soviets and the killings of
innocent people in villages.50 This is undisputable. However, both President Reagan and
President Carter actively worked to intensify the fighting (and added to the death toll) by
flooding the rebels with sophisticated weaponry, such as the F-16 bomber.51 Indeed, both Carter
and Reagan worked to create a skilled and sophisticated resistance capable of competing with the
one of the worlds most advanced militaries.

Ronald Reagan and The Mujahideen
When President Carter authorized aid to be sent to the Afghan-rebel fighters, there was
no official group or unified faction fighting against the Soviets; instead, the aid was sent to the
rather vague resistance fighters to strengthen an ill-equipped force to be able to fight against the
sophisticated Soviet Army. By the time Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the Afghan rebel
fighters had better organized and unified (to an extent) to defeat the Soviets and became referred
to globally as the mujahideen (meaning fighter of jihad). Initially, the rebel fighters were trained
by U.S. Green Berets and the Pakistani ISI in clandestine military bases in Pakistan.52 The
Reagan Administration was so dependent on the mujahideen to entrap the Soviets in endlessfighting that they conducted performance goals and frequent measures of effectiveness.53 Indeed,
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one of the staples of the Reagan Administration’s policy in Afghanistan was to have the
mujahideen as powerful and strong as possible to maximize the Soviet’s losses. For the United
States’, this was actually a long term strategy aimed at devastating the Soviet Union not only in
Afghanistan but at home and abroad as well.54 By spreading the news of the atrocities happening
in Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration created a perfect storm to weaken the Soviets—
discontent at home because of the longevity of the war and high death count, outrage by
surrounding Muslim countries who felt Islam was under attack, and condemnation and boycotts
from the international community. It is estimated that between 1981-1980 alone the CIA
funneled 60 million US dollars to Afghanistan in support of the Mujahedeen, an amount matched
by Saudi Arabia.55 Along with monetary aid to the Mujahedeen, the United States’ also supplied
the group with up to 2,500 missiles – including advanced Stinger Missiles (specially requested
by President Zia of Pakistan)—that were used by the United States for the first time in the
Vietnam War.56 CIA director William Casey also encouraged the Mujahedeen leaders to
radicalize and recruit Muslims to come to Afghanistan to conduct jihad against the Soviets.57 It
is estimated that between 1982-1992, 35,000 Muslims came from surrounding countries to fight
with the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan.58

Like all aspects of the United States’ policy in Afghanistan, the U.S. relied closely on
Pakistan to strengthen the mujahideen. The United States’ not only provided arms and military
training to the mujahideen, the U.S. (along with Saudi Arabia) funded the mujahideen’s
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education through madrassas based in Pakistan.59 The madrassas taught an extremist version of
Islam with textbooks and teaching materials provided by the United States and Saudi Arabia.60
For poor and orphaned boys in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Madrassas were often the only
option of schooling.61 Viewed in a Cold War context, Madrassas were a perfect solution for
President Reagan’s strategy of uniting Muslims to conduct jihad against the Soviets.

The Gandhi’s and Ronald Reagan: A Battle of South Asia
As the war in Afghanistan marched on, President Reagan worked to extend the war and
make it as costly as possible for the Soviet Union. Unsurprisingly, India (under Indira Gandhi)
tried its best to bring the conflict to an end by pressuring the United States. Because there was no
way to verify that all of arms sent to Pakistan from the United States went to the mujahideen
fighters, politicians at home and abroad raised concerns over a rogue group accessing arms from
the ‘leaky pipeline’. Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi (and later Rajiv Gandhi) frequently
expressed concern that the ISI would use a portion of the military equipment sent over by the
United States to launch attacks against India. When Indian officials pressured the Reagan
Administration on their extensive aid to Pakistan, the go-to U.S. response that was as long as
there are Soviet troops in Afghanistan, the United States’ will continue sending aid to Pakistan 62.
To push back against this claim, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi argued that the military equipment
sent over by the United States was unnecessarily sophisticated.63 More specifically, Rajiv Gandhi
criticized the U.S. for providing Pakistan with harpoon missiles, which are deployed off naval
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ships and advanced tanks that cannot navigate the mountainous terrain in Afghanistan.64 I
contend that the Reagan Administration sent such advanced weaponry to Pakistan to appease the
ISI’s demands and ensure a tight alliance between the two countries. Similar to how the Carter
and Reagan Administrations were willing to ignore Pakistan’s nuclear development to maintain
influence in the region, the Reagan Administration was willing to send Pakistan advanced
weapons to secure an alliance crucial to U.S. interests. An unhappy ISI meant risking the success
of the United States’ long-term goal of draining the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which was
something the Reagan Administration was unwilling to do. For Indira and Rajiv Gandhi, this
meant having to deal with an increasingly aggressive and unchecked neighbor on their border.

Along with criticizing the type of military equipment the Reagan Administration sent to
Pakistan, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi also criticized the lack of U.S. negotiations with the
Soviet Union on reaching an agreement in the region. Starting as early as 1982, India worked to
bring the Soviet Union and United States together to reach an agreement on the future of
Afghanistan. Like his predecessor Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi accused the
Reagan Administration of prolonging the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in an attempt to
bleed the Soviets of power.65 I argue that the hard bargain mentality possessed by President
Reagan (and outright refusal to meet the Soviets in the middle) was a strategic choice to make
the Soviet invasion as costly as possible and diminish their standing globally. In meetings
between President Gorbachev and Indian Foreign Secretary A.P. Venkateswaran, Gorbachev
expressed to the Indian official that the Soviet Union would consider withdrawing from
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Afghanistan if he felt confident Afghanistan would remain “neutral and unaligned”.66 67 Because
the Reagan Administration did not want a timely Soviet withdrawal (remember National Security
Advisor Brzezinski called a quick Soviet victory the “worst outcome possible” 68), the U.S.
refused to accept Soviet propositions for an agreement on Afghanistan. When the Soviet Union
offered proposals on a settlement in 1987, President Reagan doubted the seriousness of the
proposals and cited increased Soviet military aggression at the Pakistan border as justification for
increased U.S. aid to Pakistan and the mujahideen.69 Indeed, this refusal to reach a timely
agreement on Afghanistan helps to prove my argument that the United States’ (under both Carter
and Reagan) viewed the conflict as beneficial to U.S. long-term interests in so far as the Soviet
Union ruined their credibility in the region and suffered substantial loss. Because this was the
goal of the United States’, India, the Soviet Union and the U.S. engaged in over of five years of
mundane talks before reaching a suitable agreement on Afghanistan.

Despite the Soviet Union’s alleged willingness to leave the region if Afghanistan existed
as neutral and non-aligned, the Soviet Union became unhappy with Afghan President Babrak
Karmal (who they installed in 1979) and replaced him with Mohammed Najibullah in 1986. For
President Reagan, the installation of Najibullah as President of Afghanistan amidst talks of
withdrawal confirmed the United States’ long belief that the Soviet Union wanted Afghanistan as
a satellite state and gave President Reagan another reason to justify prolonging the war.70
Alternatively, the Reagan Administration conveyed they would only agree to reaching a solution
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on Afghanistan if Karmal was disposed and an interim-government took place of the Sovietbacked PDPA.71 It is worth noting that while the Reagan Administration refused to consider any
solution to the war in Afghanistan that resulted in a Soviet-friendly Afghan Government,
President Reagan advocated for former King Zahir Shah to oversee the potential interimgovernment in Afghanistan.72 Indeed, this highlights yet another contradiction in U.S. foreign
policy in Afghanistan at the time—while President Reagan refused to reach an agreement that
did not include a “fresh start” without the Soviet-backed leadership, he called for U.S-backed
Zahir Shah to oversee the future of Afghanistan. While the Reagan Administration publicly
called for self-determination of the future of Afghanistan post-Soviet withdrawal, they worked
behind the scenes to bring back Zahir Shah, the last King of Afghanistan who was overthrown in
a largely popular coup d’état in 1973.

As the war in Afghanistan waged on, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi became increasingly
concerned about fundamentalist groups in Pakistan that received support from Zia and the United
States.73 To be sure, India no longer viewed the mujahideen as a group conducting jihad against
the Soviets, but as a powerful military operation that had the power and equipment to attack
India.74 Prime Minister Gandhi expressed to the Reagan Administration that President Zia’s role
in supporting the mujahideen no longer had the same basis as it once did, and that President Zia
had begun using aid and military weapons to promote Islamic fundamentalism.75 Gandhi
specifically criticized the Reagan Administration for their support of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the
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leader of an extremist group in Afghanistan fighting against the Soviets (specifically with their
eyes set on Kabul).76 The United States’ willingness to support extremist groups in Afghanistan
to wage jihad against the Soviets proved another point of departure for U.S. and Indian interests
in the region. While India was addiment about Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the
removal of all foreign intervention, Prime Minister Gandhi was unwilling to support a
fundamentalist government in Afghanistan. For the United States, the more fundamentalism in
the region—inspired by the mujahideen—meant less Soviet influence, which meant a Cold War
victory for the United States.

The Long Goodbye: The Superpowers leave Afghanistan
1988 served as a consequential year for the battle over South Asia for two main reasons:
the United States’ closest ally and staunch supporter of the Afghan rebels Pakistani President Zia
Ul-Huq was killed in a plane crash, and the United States and Soviet Union agreed to meet in
Geneva, Switzerland to reach a settlement on Afghanistan.77 While it is true President Zia and
President Reagan had a close relationship where the United States’ worked to appease Zia, the
immediate continuance of the alliance following Zia’s death proves that the United States’
partnership to Pakistan wasn’t dependent on a specific relationship among two people but instead
centered around Pakistan’s geopolitical strategic significance in defeating the Soviets. On August
17th, 1988 President Zia visited the Tamewali Test Range, a military launchpad located in
Pakistan.78 President Zia was accompanied by American Ambassador to Pakistan, Raphel
Arnold, Chief of the American Mission in Pakistan General Herbet Wasson, and senior officials
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of the Pakistan Military.79 The US and Pakistani officials left the military site on a private plane,
which crashed shortly after taking off and resulted in the death of all passengers onboard.
Officially, the United States’ declared the plane crash as an accident and cited faulty equipment.
While the Reagan Administration publicly expressed their condolences for the death of Zia, they
scrambled behind the scenes to ensure Pakistan remained the main supporter for the Afghan
rebel fighters.80 It was important to the Reagan Administration that Pakistan at least appear to
hold democratic elections to replace President Zia, so Congress would view the billions sent in
aid over the past ten years as beneficial.81 Immediately after Zia’s death, new US Ambassador to
Pakistan Robert Oakley met with Pakistan General Mirza Beg, who became Chief of the Army
after Zia’s death.82 Both men assured each other of their country’s commitment to the other and
reaffirmed their mutual desire to have the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan’s politics.83.Beg
himself said he considered Pakistan and Afghanistan to be “one people” among two nations.84

After years of stalled negotiations and disagreements over what the future of Afghanistan
would look like, President Gorbachev announced in February 1988 that the Soviet Union would
begin to pull troops out of Afghanistan that year so long as the Geneva Accords were signed by
March 15.85 In April of 1988 (just a month after Gorbachev’s deadline) representatives from
Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States and Soviet Union met in Geneva, Switzerland to sign
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the agreed upon accords. The Accords largely favored the United States and were contingent on
the complete removal of any Soviet-backed government. Importantly, the Accords did not call
for a cease-fire and the United States’ said it would continue to provide the rebel fighters with
arms so long as the Soviet Government continued to provide arms to the Afghan Government.86
Notably left out of the talks were the mujahideen fighters, who vowed to continue fighting after
the Soviet Union was out of Afghanistan. What’s more, both Pakistan and the United States—
despite signing the Accords—considered the current government of Afghanistan “illegitimate
and unworthy of diplomatic recognition” and would only recognize a government determined
without Soviet influence.87 Indeed, both the United States and Pakistan insisted they would not
follow the Accords, or consider them legitimate, until the Soviet Union cut off aid to
Afghanistan and withdrew all of their 115,000 troops in the region.88 Because of the refusal to
implement a ceasefire and stop arm-shipments, aggressive fighting continued in Afghanistan
after the Accords were signed. President Reagan doubted the Soviet Union’s commitment to the
Accords and accused the Soviets of increasing attacks on the Pakistan/ Afghan border. It is true
the Soviets increased aggression in the region after signing the Accords—they successfully
reoccupied Kunduz (a city in Northern Afghanistan) and invaded Pakistani airspace.89 Because
of this, President Reagan increased arms sales to Pakistan, including the sale of the F16
Stinger.90 Amongst the increased violence that followed the Accords, the Soviet Union indeed
began to slowly remove their troops in Afghanistan, with the first contingent leaving on May
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16th. 91 Although the Soviet Union slowly began to lessen their presence in the region, warfare in
Afghanistan remained strong.

The spike in fighting in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal reflects the true
primary goal of the United States’ in Afghanistan—to destroy the Soviet’s political and
economic presence in the region and establish a government friendly with Pakistan and open to
Western influence. Had the United States’ just wanted a Soviet withdrawal and selfdetermination in Afghanistan—as expressed time and time again by both President Carter and
Reagan—the US would have followed the Geneva Agreements and remained neutral in the
future government of Afghanistan. Instead, as the Soviet troops continued to leave the region the
United States’ continued to send aid and weaponry to the rebel fighters to assist in their fight to
topple the existing government.92 The continued support for the mujahideen came after Afghan
President Najibullah called for the complete removal of Soviet troops and said Afghanistan was
strong enough to stand without foreign assistance from the Soviets.93 For the Reagan
Administration this proved unsatisfactory and he vowed to continue aid to the rebels until they
successfully overthrew the Najibullah Government in Kabul. After talks of bringing back Zahir
Shah to hold a loya jirga (a government council) were squashed, the Reagan Administration
began to back Burhanuddin Rabbani as the next potential leader of Afghanistan. Throughout the
war, Rabanni established himself as pro-Islamist leader of the mujahideen and met with the
United States’ several times, including a meeting with President Reagan in November of 1988.94
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This marked a slight shift in US aid to Afghanistan, as the US now began to send aid directly to
mujahideen leaders (instead of through Pakistan) in hope of establishing one of the leaders as
head of the new government.95 Again, the Reagan Administrations investment in the future
leader of Afghanistan directly contradicts his non-aligned stance and call for self-determination
for the Afghan people.

By the turn of the new year, the Soviet Union was still in the process of leaving
Afghanistan. According to President Gorbachev, the lingering Soviet withdrawal from
Afghanistan was due to increased rebel attacks on Soviet troops and government-held cities in
Afghanistan.96 To be sure, President Gorbachev criticized the Reagan Administration for not
following the agreement laid out in the Geneva Accords to equally reduce US involvement in the
region alongside the Soviet withdrawal, which resulted in a back-and-forth between Reagan and
Gorbachev over who was committed to the Geneva Accords and who was failing to uphold their
end of the agreement. In January, Afghan officials predicted Kabul and the Najibullah
Government would fall within weeks of complete Soviet withdrawal from the region.97 While the
fighting over Kabul continued, the turn of the new year brought changes to the United States
Government—President Reagan left office and was replaced by his Vice President George Bush.
As expected, President Bush vowed to continue Ronald Reagan (and President Carter’s) policy
towards Afghanistan and worked to aid the mujahideen in toppling the existing Afghan
government.
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On January 30, 1989 confident of a complete Soviet withdrawal and fall of the Najibullah
Regime, The United States’ closed its embassy in Kabul. Upon closing the embassy in Kabul,
Jon Glassman, the US Charge d’Affaires expressed optimism about freedom and peace for the
future of Afghanistan and said “Goodbye… We are going home”.98 While the US Government
publicly expressed optimism about the future of Afghanistan, the embassies actually closed
because they feared impending anarchy (and the safety of US diplomats) once the Soviets were
completely out of Afghanistan.99 This illustrates that the United States’ (under both Reagan and
Carter) had little concern about the people of Afghanistan so long as the region was free from
Soviet-backed communist rule. Indeed, the closing of the US Embassy signaled the United
States’ distancing themselves from Afghanistan. While President Bush had promised the Afghan
people that the United States’ would play a critical part in bringing stability in the region after
the Soviets left, the United States’ physical presence similarly decreased as well. Fighting
between the current communist government under Najibullah and the rebel fighters reached an
all-time high in February, when President Najibullah summoned civilians to take arms to fight
against a rebel attack in Kabul.100 President Bush’s administration agreed to continue to send aid
to the rebel fighters until the Najibullah regime toppled, again re-establishing the United States’
commitment to rid the country of communism and deliver a final blow to the Soviet Union.101 In
February, President Najibullah declared Kabul to be under a state of emergency and in March,
the Interim Government of Afghanistan (made up of rebel fighters and led by Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar) was officially established and recognized by the Islamic Confrence and supported by

98

Ibid.
Ibid.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid.
99

56

the United States.102 By February 15 of 1989, the Soviet Union announced all of their troops had
officially left Afghanistan. Despite the official departure and seeming conclusion of the proxy
war between the two great powers, intense fighting continued in Afghanistan over the future of
the country. Worrisome to the Bush Administration was the fact that the rebels were fighting
with advanced military equipment provided by the United States, including F16 Stingers and
other surface-to-air missiles.103 Attempts to buy-back the millions of dollars of weaponry sent by
the United States proved worthless. Along with the heightened civil war over the future of
Afghanistan (and Soviet departure) came several tragic consequences. Indeed, food shortage was
so severe that it was reported 30,000 Afghan children ran the risk of major illness and death from
malnutrition.104 Up to two million people were displaced in Afghanistan alone from the war,
with more refugees in Pakistan and Iran. Over two million civilians were killed along with
90,000 mujahideen fighters and 18,000 Afghan troops.105 Both the United States’ and former
Soviet Union shifted their attention elsewhere as the Cold War came to a close, having left a
mark on Afghanistan the Afghani people would not soon forget. Perhaps former CIA Director
Robert Gates summarized best how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent US
involvement was a Cold War battle between the two Super-Powers at the expense of Afghan
people when he said “Afghanistan was at least free of the foreign invader. Now Afghans could
resume fighting among themselves—and hardly anyone cared”.106
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Conclusion

To be sure, the tragedy of Afghanistan cannot be blamed solely on the Americans. For
twelve years, the Soviet Union violated international law by having troops in Afghanistan while
waging an unrelenting war that completely divided and wrecked an already unstable country.
Many of the two million Afghan refugees were never able to return home, and those who
remained in Afghanistan were jobless, had broken families and no real state infrastructure to
support them. Many young men (including those who were children during the Soviet invasion
and received their education in Madrassas) joined in on the continuous fighting. Despite
promises from the United States to help rebuild Afghanistan, US aid came to an end under the
Bush Administration. When the Taliban officially came to power in 1992, it appeared to the
outside world that stability—albeit resulting from an authoritarian regime— finally reached
Afghanistan. Internally, however, Afghanistan remained divided and the civil war continued. It
wasn’t until the end of the decade that the United States’ refocused on Afghanistan and the
extremism breeding there and in neighboring Pakistan. Central to the resurgence of attention
towards the region was Osama bin Laden’s terror group, al-Qaeda, which launched attacks
against Americans around the globe (see the Yemen hotel bombings in 1998 and attack of the
USS Cole in 2000). Indeed, bin Laden and several high ranking members of al-Qaeda were
former mujahideen who previously worked alongside the United States to defeat the Soviet
Union. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center marked a turning point not only in
the United States’ relationship with Afghanistan, but globally as well. The United States invaded
Afghanistan on October 7, 2001 with the goals of capturing bin Laden and toppling the Taliban
regime, both of which were accomplished. Eighteen years later, however, and the United States
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remains in Afghanistan with no clear endgame in sight. One could argue the United States
prolonged involvement in Afghanistan resembles the Soviet invasion that lasted over a decade.
Since the 2001 invasion, over 2,000 US Military personnel have died from fighting in
Afghanistan.107 Considered altogether, this makes for a tragic story of war, nationalism and
revenge for which multiple countries have suffered. It is my hope that the history of Afghanistan
and the United States’ involvement there serve as a reminder of the dangers of pursuing a
national self-interest in countries around the world under the guise of humanitarian intervention.
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